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Patents Are Not
Probabilities:
Refuting the Probabilistic
Patent Theory
BY BRYAN GANT ∗

The probabilistic patent theory espoused by Carl Shapiro and Mark
Lemley suggests that the lawful term of a patent is limited by the probability
that the patent will be held valid and enforceable. For example, under this
theory a patent with a 60% chance of being held valid and enforceable would
lawfully grant 60% of a statutory patent term; any enforcement beyond that
point would risk violating the antitrust laws.
This article explains that Shapiro and Lemley’s theory has at least three
fatal flaws: First, it depends on a “judicially-created” view of patents the
Supreme Court has since rejected in Oil States Energy Services v. Greene’s
Energy Group. Second, it mistakes a decrease in the value of property in
light of litigation risk for a decrease in the ownership or scope of the
property; as with all other forms of litigation regarding property, patent
litigation may be “probabilistic” but the property in dispute is not. Third,
because no patent is without some (often undefinable) level of risk, this
theory would shorten the enforceable term of every patent—and would
moreover do so to an un undeterminable extent.
Finally, the article refutes the suggestion, adopted by the California
Supreme Court, that the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the probabilistic patent
theory in its 2013 decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. As the article
demonstrates, Actavis instead applied a theory based only on the
probabilities of litigation, not the probabilities of a patent.

Bryan Gant is a partner in the Global Competition Group of White & Case LLP and represents
defendants in ongoing cases involving antitrust and patent issues. The views expressed herein are his
own, and do not necessary reflect the views of White & Case or its clients. He would like to thank Prof.
Daniel Sokol, Tripp Odom, and Helen J. Gant for their comments and suggestions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Under the flawed “probabilistic” theory of patents, first put forward by
the economist Carl Shapiro in 2001 and expanded upon by Shapiro and Mark
Lemley in an oft-cited 2005 article, patent rights would not truly exist unless
and until the patent was upheld and enforced by a court, and the risk that the
court might not uphold and enforce the patent would decrease not just the
value but, remarkably, also the lawfully-enforceable term of the patent.1
Patent rights would be “probabilistic” under this theory because they would
depend on the probability of a court ruling in favor of the patentee; if the
patentee was 60% likely to prevail in patent litigation, it would presumably
be lawfully entitled to enforce the patent for just 60% of the statutorilygranted term.
The probabilistic patent theory has at least three fatal flaws, however.
First, the probabilistic patent theory assumes a judicial role in the
creation of patent rights, but the Supreme Court has since rejected the
existence of any such judicial role. Under this theory, only a court’s
enforcement of a patent creates patent rights, and as such those rights are
necessarily limited by the probability that the patentee will or will not
convince a court to enforce the patent. However, the Supreme Court in Oil
States Energy Services v. Greene’s Energy Group recently instructed that
patent rights are a creation of statute—not a creation of the judicial process. 2
Thus no court ruling is required to create enforceable patent rights, as the
probabilistic patent theory assumes.
Second, the probabilistic patent theory confuses a potential decrease in
the value of disputed property for a decrease in the ownership or scope of
that property. Litigation may be probabilistic, and the threat or existence of
litigation may thus make a given piece of property less valuable for resale on
an open market. However, the underlying property itself—whether the fox
in the famous law school brainteaser Pierson v. Post, 3 the hypothetical
1. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Antitrust limits to patent settlements 34 RAND J. Econ. 391, 395 (2003)
(originally circulated 2001); Carl Shapiro and Mark Lemley, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP.
75 (2005); Keith Leffler & Cristofer Leffler, The Probabilistic Nature of Patent Rights: In Response to
Kevin McDonald, 17 Antitrust 77 (Summer 2003); Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law § 2046f5
(adopting the probabilistic view). See also Kevin McDonald, Hatch-Waxman Patent Settlements and
Antitrust: On “Probabilistic” Patent Rights and False Positives, 17 Antitrust 68 (Spring 2003). Prior
authors had suggested changing the patent laws to make patents probabilistic; Shapiro, however, was the
first to suggest that they already were. See, e.g., Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentee’s
Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and NonInjunctive Remedies, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 985 (Feb. 1999).
2. 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018) (“granting patents is one of the constitutional functions that can
be carried out by the executive or legislative departments without ‘judicial determination.’”) (quoting
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50-51 (1931); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)).
3. 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805).
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Blackacre estate, a copyright, or a patent—is not probabilistic, i.e., it need
not be shared among the litigants based on their odds of litigation success.
Rather, the property is owned in full by someone, whether or not we
immediately know who, with definable boundaries even if those boundaries
are disputed.
Third, patents would be a very strange form of property under the
probabilistic patent theory: One whose boundaries change based on such
external variables as whether the patent was before a favorable judge,
whether the patentee hired a skilled advocate, and whether that advocate was
having a good day in court. And because no patent is completely free of
litigation risk, even if previously upheld by a court, no patentee would be
entitled to the full patent term granted by Congress. The probabilistic patent
theory would thus undermine the value of patents generally.
Nor does the probabilistic patent theory draw support from the Supreme
Court’s 2013 decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 4 as at least one state court has
subsequently concluded. 5 If anything Actavis—which addressed the legality
of so-called “reverse payment” patent settlements—holds only that patent
litigation may be probabilistic, and that a settlement that short-circuits the
patent litigation process thus might require further antitrust analysis. The
patent itself, however, is no more probabilistic than any other form of
property might be, and, indeed subsequent courts have held that the patent
therefore survives the Actavis analysis.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH PROBABILISTIC PATENTS: THREE FATAL FLAWS
UNDERMINE SHAPIRO AND LEMLEY’S PROBABILISTIC PATENT THEORY
Patents are property. As the Supreme Court has said, “[t]he Patent Act
provides that, ‘[s]ubject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the
attributes of personal property.’” 6 And like other forms of property, a patent
offers the right to exclude—here, the right to exclude others from practicing
the patent for the length of the patent grant. 7 As the Court thus reiterated

4. 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
5. In re Cipro Cases I & II (“Cipro (Cal)”), 61 Cal. 4th 116, 143 (Cal. 2015).
6. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1375 (quoting 35 U. S. C. §261); see also United States v. American
Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315, 370 (1888) (patent rights the “private property of the patentee”);
McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Aultman, 169 U. S. 606, 609 (1898) (“[A granted patent] has
become the property of the patentee”); Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 197 (1857) (“[T]he rights of a
party under a patent are his private property”).
7. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (patents provide inventors “for limited times . . . the exclusive right
to their respective . . . discoveries”).
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recently, “[w]hile a patent lasts, the patentee possesses exclusive rights to
the patented article.” 8
However, some scholars—most prominently Shapiro and Lemley—
have advocated a “probabilistic” theory of patents under which a patentee
does not have exclusive property rights, but rather only the possibility of such
exclusive rights based on a probability of the patent being enforced in court,
such that a patent’s term and value must be divided between the patentee and
would-be infringers based on litigation risk. 9 For example, imagine a
presumptively-valid patent with a 20-year statutory term that is 95% likely
to be upheld and enforced if challenged. 10 Such an ironclad patent would be
rare; experienced litigators will tell you that patent litigation is always
uncertain and that even the strongest patent has some inherent and
unavoidable risk (likely more than 5%) of invalidation, even if such
invalidation could only be based on some legal or factual error by the
courts. 11 Under the probabilistic patent theory, though, this ironclad patent
is presumably not a “20 year” patent but rather a “19 year” patent—95% of
20 years—because the patentee must share 5% with patent challengers to
account for the 5% risk of invalidation, or else potentially violate the antitrust
laws.
But the probabilistic patent theory is simply wrong, for at least three
main reasons.
A. First Fatal Flaw: The Probabilistic Patent Theory Depends on a
“Litigation Created Rights” Theory of Patents the Supreme Court
Has Rejected
First, the probabilistic patent theory depends on a “litigation created”
view of patent rights that the Supreme Court has since rejected. Some,
including not just Shapiro and Lemley but also the California Supreme
Court, have argued that patent rights are probabilistic because patent
enforcement can only be accomplished by showing patent validity and
8. Kimble v. Marvel Ent’t, LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 451 (2015).
9. See, e.g., Shapiro & Lemley, supra note 1 at 75; Leffler & Leffler, supra note 1; Shapiro, supra
note 1; McDonald, supra note 1.
10. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2); 35 U.S.C. § 156.
11. See, e.g., Kent S. Bernard and Willard K. Tom, Antitrust Treatment of Pharmaceutical Patent
Settlements: The Need for Context and Fidelity to First Principles, 15 Fed. Cir. Bar. J. 617, 627 (2006)
(“It is an old litigators’ adage that when your case is an absolute, slam-dunk, sure thing, there is a 15%
chance of losing.”); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 159-160 (1990) (“[I]t is just not possible for a
litigant to prove in advance that the judicial system will lead to any particular result in his case.”); In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 200 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“a legal theory
dependent on predicting the outcome of a specific lawsuit is unduly speculative”); Mathewson Corp. v.
Allied Marine Industries, Inc., 827 F.2d 850, 855 (1st Cir. 1987) (“no broad market by which one can
measure precisely the objective value of a lawsuit”).
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infringement in a court. 12 Under this view, patent rights are probabilistic
because they are (the theory goes) a creation of litigation, which is itself
probabilistic. 13 Thus, as Shapiro and Lemley put it, the right granted by a
patent would be considered not “the right to exclude but rather a right to try
to exclude by asserting the patent in court.” 14 This is both incorrect and
irrelevant.
As the Supreme Court recently explained in Oil States Energy v.
Greene’s Energy, patents are a particular kind of property right: the right to
a franchise created by statute, not by courts. 15 The non-judicial nature of
patents was essential to the Court’s decision in that case to uphold
Congress’s adoption of an inter partes patent review system outside of the
judicial system—it was only because patents do not require any judicial
stamp of approval that they could be reviewed through proceedings that did
not require a court. 16 And the Supreme Court’s conclusion was moreover
consistent with Congress’s statement in the Patent Act that a patent is
presumptively valid until a court (or the Patent and Trademark Office) holds
otherwise, rather than invalid until validated by a court as the probabilistic
theory of patents would assume. 17 The Supreme Court thus rejected a view
of patent rights that must be “judicially determined” in order to be
enforced—and in doing so rejected a key assumption underpinning the
probabilistic patent theory. 18
But the view of patents as litigation-created rights was incorrect even
before Oil States. Shapiro and Lemley rested their theory on the factual
assertion that only 0.1% of patents are litigated through trial, with roughly
half of those patents then invalidated—such that only 0.05% of patents are

12. See Cipro (Cal), 61 Cal. 4th at 143 (“A patent is, in effect, a right to ask the government to
exercise its power to keep others from using an invention without consent.”). Although Cipro (Cal) cited
Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969), for this proposition, Zenith did not suggest that the
patent grant was only the right to ask the government to enforce a patent—and on the contrary made clear
that a patentee could treat the patent as property, for example by licensing it to others.
13. See Cipro (Cal), 61 Cal. 4th at 143.
14. Shapiro & Lemley, supra note 1 at 75.
15. See Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373 (permitting inter partes review because the statutory scheme
for patents permitted such reviews, and noting that “patents are public franchises that the Government
grants to the inventors of new and useful improvements.”) (quotations omitted).
16. See id. (“granting patents is one of the constitutional functions that can be carried out by the
executive or legislative departments without ‘judicial determination.’”) (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at
50-51; Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 451).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”). See also In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 533 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[T]he premise, as
characterized by generic defendants, that every patent is ‘a little bit invalid,’ results in undermining the
presumption of validity that Congress has afforded patents”).
18. See Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373.
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successfully enforced through judicial action. 19 This suggested to Shapiro
and Lemley that a patent right is little more than a lottery ticket which can in
rare cases allow a patentee to exclude others and earn valuable returns, and
thus that patent rights should not be seen as legitimate unless and until a court
says that they are. 20 However, even after adopting these figures, 99.95% of
patents are not invalidated, and thus presumably would maintain their full
patent term. 21
In response, Shapiro and Lemley argued that this number is so high only
because most patents are not enforced in court, and further suggested that
such lack of enforcement means that the patents must not be worth
enforcing—that patents not enforced in court are more or less worthless, and
need not be considered property rights at all in the traditional sense. 22
However, most property rights do not need to be enforced in court. 23 Anyone
who has sent or received a cease-and-desist letter can attest that intellectual
property can be enforced through private action. Moreover, private
enforcement often does not require even such affirmative steps; most people
will not intentionally trespass on someone else’s property, or infringe
intellectual property, even if not explicitly warned away. Thus, not only are
property rights often privately enforced, they are also often self-enforcing—
i.e., the rights are respected even without active enforcement.
Contrary to Shapiro and Lemley’s assumption that only litigated patents
are strong, 24 the strongest property rights are thus potentially the ones that
no one would challenge. Just as no one wants to spend thousands or millions
of dollars litigating against an ironclad title to Blackacre (the venerable estate
that serves as the basis for many law school property hypotheticals), no one
wants to spend millions of dollars challenging a completely insurmountable
patent. Indeed, perversely, the probabilistic theory of patents would change
this dynamic. Because even a speculative challenge would shave some
portion off the patent term and allow a challenger to enter sooner, merely by
creating a greater risk (however remote) that the patentee might not win the
resulting litigation, challengers with little chance of success would have
reason to bring even meritless challenges to shorten the “probabilistic”
patent term.
19. Shapiro & Lemley, supra note 1 at 75-76.
20. Id. at 80-81.
21. Id. at 82–83.
22. Id. at 75–76.
23. Id. at 94. (Shapiro & Lemley do recognize that “[v]irtually every licensing agreement can be
seen as the settlement of a potential patent dispute.” However, they fail to recognize that this is in fact a
much more common way to reach agreement than the full-blown expense of litigation.)
24. See id. at 75–76.
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Nor is it any answer to say that the enforceability of a patent depends
on showing infringement rather than just validity and ownership.
Infringement, after all, is nothing more than the patent equivalent of a
boundary dispute over Blackacre. An alleged trespasser on Blackacre may
respond by arguing that in fact Blackacre is not as large as its owner claims,
and that its boundary thus stops short of where the trespasser has set up shop.
A court might then be required to determine this boundary. But while we
may not know how this boundary dispute will be resolved in the end, we do
know that there is a boundary—Blackacre stops somewhere. Similarly, a
potential infringer may argue that a patent is not as broad as the patentee
claims, and thus that it does not reach the would-be infringer’s product. In
both cases, the scope of the property rather than the ownership of the
property is at issue, but in neither case is the property thus probabilistic, and
in neither case does the property depend on judicial determination to come
into being.
Finally, even if patent rights were as routinely worthless as Shapiro and
Lemley suggest, this would not mean that Congress granted those patent
rights to any lesser degree. When Congress granted patent rights and
established that such patents should be treated as valid absent clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, 25 it did not include a provision holding
that such rights would go away to a certain degree if law professors ever
became skeptical of the patent system. Thus, whether patents are generally
strong or weak, they are presumptively valid.
B. Second Fatal Flaw: The Probabilistic Patent Theory Confuses a
Decrease in the Value of Property for a Decrease in the Ownership
or Scope of Property Rights
The second argument for a probabilistic view of patents is that a patent’s
value on an open market may depend on its likelihood of being upheld. Thus,
for example, Shapiro and Lemley compare “probabilistic patents” to the
ownership of a house in which the title is not entirely clear and suggest that
because the value of this property may thus be reduced the property is
probabilistic. 26 However, this does not follow. While true that a potential
stain on the title may decrease the value of a piece of property at resale, no
court would or could grant a title challenger, say, ownership of 10% of the
property to reflect a 10% risk of the title being invalidated.

25.
26.

35 U.S.C. § 282.
Shapiro & Lemley, supra note 1 at 76.
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Shapiro and Lemley thus confuse probabilistic litigation for a
probabilistic title. It is true that with any title there is risk of litigation, and
further true that there is some probabilistic risk inherent in any litigation; as
Shapiro and Lemley note, this is why title insurance exists.27 But while the
litigation is thus probabilistic, the title itself is not probabilistic; it is owned
in full by someone, even if there may be some probability that it will not be
the owner we think.
To understand the distinction, consider Pierson v. Post, the famous New
York Supreme Court case that continues to perplex law students 215 years
later. 28 When Captain Jesse Pierson shot the fox Mr. Lodowick Post was
pursuing, a court was required to determine whether the fox was the property
of Captain Pierson, the shooter, or Mr. Post, the original pursuer. 29 Both
hunters had a claim to ownership, and both faced some risk (or “probability”)
that the court might find their claim invalid and thus rule for the other party.
The question was a close one, with the court ultimately relying on authority
ranging from a 1707 English case involving ducks on a duck pond30
to Puffendorf’s Law of Nature and of Nations. 31 Indeed, although the
appeals court concluded that Captain Pierson, as the individual who killed
the fox, was the first to transform ferae naturae into property, future U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Henry Brockholst Livingston dissented from the
court’s judgment, arguing that the dispute should have been put to an
arbitration panel of sportsmen who likely would have ruled for Mr. Post.32
And of course the trial court had ruled against Captain Pierson and in favor
of Mr. Post. 33
But while this was an exceedingly close case, and Captain Pierson and
Mr. Post thus each faced some probability of losing, there was no suggestion
of apportioning the fox according to the strength of each gentleman’s
respective legal claims. No one suggested that because Mr. Pierson had, say,
a 51% chance of success, he should get 51% of the fox. Instead, someone
owned the fox, and that person not only owned the whole fox but was
permitted to deny ownership to all others. The litigation may have been
“probabilistic,” but the fox was not.
27. Id.
28. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805); see also Bethany R. Berger, It’s Not About the Fox:
The Untold History of Pierson v. Post, 55 DUKE L. J. 1089 (Apr. 2006) (for further explanation of this
fascinating case).
29. Pierson, 3 Cai. R. 175.
30. Keble v. Hickringill, 11 Mod. 74, 88 Eng. Rep. 898 (King’s Bench, 1707).
31. Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 177, 179.
32. Id. at 180.
33. Id. at 175.
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The court in Pierson v. Post was constrained to award the fox to either
Captain Pierson or Mr. Post, rather than dividing it among them like King
Solomon, because property “must be capable of exclusive possession or
control.” 34 Thus “property rights only exist if the person asserting the
property right has a legitimate claim to the exclusive possession of that right
and is capable of excluding others from such possession.” 35 Whether one
person owns it or another person owns it, someone owns it in full based on
definable property rights, and those rights are exclusive of all others. 36 Thus
even if Mr. Pierson may, mid-trial, have only been able to sell the fox for
51% of its value in light of the litigation risk he was facing, at no point did
he own 51% of the fox—he was either the full owner of the fox or he was
not.
Nor is there anything about intellectual property that would remove it
from this paradigm. For example, when “The Wind Done Gone,” a parody
of Margaret Mitchell’s “Gone With the Wind,” was published, there was a
dispute as to whether that parody infringed the Mitchell estate’s copyright—
but there was no suggestion that the estate was obligated to share the
copyright based on its odds of success in litigation. 37 Rather, the question
was the “boundaries” of that copyright, and whether it extended to preclude
the publishing of a parody.
Finally, a patent is likewise property and not simply the possibility of
property. While it is of course true that an ironclad patent could be sold on
an open market for more than a weak patent, this difference in value does
not equate to a difference in ownership or a difference in scope any more
than would be the case with a fox, a piece of real property, or a copyright.
Patents are thus not probabilistic, even if patent litigation may be.

34. Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs. v.
Kalitta Flying Serv., 958 F.2d 896, 902-03 (9th Cir. 1992)).
35. Alderson v. United States, 718 F. Supp. 2d. 1186, 1197 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (collecting authority).
36. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984) (“The right to exclude others
is generally one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property.”); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (“The ‘right to exclude[]’ [is]
universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right”) (quoting Int’l News Svc. v. Assoc.
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
37. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001).
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C. Third Fatal Flaw: The Probabilistic Theory of Patents Would
Shorten Patent Terms by an Undefinable Amount
i. Litigation Probabilities, and Thus Probabilistic Patent Terms, Cannot Be
Perfectly Predicted
Finally, adopting a probabilistic patent approach would lead to
substantial uncertainty regarding patent terms. The only thing that would be
clear, under this theory, would be that no patent would last for its
Congressionally-mandated term—all patents would be shortened by some
amount, with no one able to truly say by how much. This is so for four
reasons:
First, litigation probabilities are hardly fixed in stone at the moment of
a patent’s creation, and on the contrary could change even day to day or
minute to minute. Imagine that the same “95%” patent we mentioned above
is challenged and the case assigned to an unfavorable judge—one who tends
to invalidate patents, or simply one who may not be as experienced in the
patent law area. This lowers the probability of success to a “mere” 90%. In
that case, the patent term is now 18 years under a probabilistic patent theory
because the probability of successful enforcement has gone down due to
something completely unrelated to the patent merits—the random turn of an
assignment wheel. Now imagine that there is a hearing. The patentee’s
counsel gets up, the argument goes well, and the patent is up to 95%. But
then the challenger’s counsel gets up, their argument also goes well, and the
patent is back down to 90% again. The patent, in that example, changes its
term by a year—from 18 years to 19 and then back to 18—based on which
lawyer happens to be at the podium. 38 What a strange property right this
would be. 39
Second, the term might vary based on which lawyer the patentee hires.
One author has suggested that because patent rights are purportedly
probabilistic, they are also necessarily “malleable” in the sense that their
probability of enforcement will be dependent on the potential “players”
(attorneys, judges, etc.) involved. 40 Thus, the term of a probabilistic patent
would depend not on the novelty of the invention, the strength of the claims,
or the infringement of the patent challenger, but rather on which side hired
38. See Jason Rantanen, The Malleability of Patent Rights, 2015 Mich. St. L. Rev. 895, 929-30
(2015) (arguing that patent rights are “malleable” in the sense that they change based on the particular
parties at issue).
39. See id. There are, of course, many other ways that a patent might end up shortened under this
approach, including changes in the case law or shifts in patent valuation methods.
40. See id. (“And just like a contest, a sport, a game, patent litigation—and by extension, the patent
right itself—is affected by the participants in that game.”).
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the fancier lawyer. 41 Among other issues, this would grant greater patent
terms to patentees with deeper pockets, who are able to hire famous litigators
and on that basis alone have a higher probability of success. But more
fundamentally, it would make patent rights dependent on something
extraneous to the patent or the would-be infringer—indeed, something
having nothing to do with the patent merits whatsoever.
Third, because patent enforcement depends on proving infringement,
the probability of successfully doing so may vary based on the counterparties. A patentee may have a 95% chance of enforcing its patent against
Infringer A, but only a 90% chance of enforcing its patent against Infringer
B. Under a probabilistic patent theory, then, the patentee would hold a 19
year patent as against Infringer A but only an 18 year patent as against
Infringer B. 42 In order to determine the appropriate term of such a patent,
the patentee would thus need to determine the merits of every aspect of each
of the potential infringers’ non-infringement arguments in each of the
potential patent disputes, which is surely an impossible task.
Finally, when discussing these probabilities, we act like there is some
sort of magical scoreboard that records the odds of winning a patent case.
There is not. Nor are these probabilities scientifically-derived by litigating
the same case hundreds of times, and then calculating the average outcomes.
Rather, they are simply educated guesses made by lawyers and litigants,
often based on limited information. 43 So, then, whose views should we credit
for determining the probabilities? For example, imagine that there are two
patentees. One says the patent is 95% likely to be upheld and enforced; the
other says 90%. Should we credit the optimist? The pessimist? The patent
challenger? Someone else entirely?
Because there is no way to know the “right” probability for any given
patent, probabilistic patents would have terms that constantly fluctuate, and
in effect cannot be determined, particularly ex ante. But one thing is certain:
because even the strongest imaginable patent is never 100% guaranteed to
be upheld, no patent would have the term Congress granted.

41. See id. at 929 n. 138 (comparing patent litigation to a sport and noting that “[i]n sports, some
events are due to chance; much is also due to the skill of the individual players”).
42. See id. at 929–30.
43. Litigants famously tend to view their odds of success as higher than they really are. See, e.g.,
DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR NEUTRAL ADVOCATES
217 (1996) (if litigants are asked to estimate their odds of success, the combined total is likely to exceed
150 percent).
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ii. Litigating a Patent Does Not Solve This Problem
Nor does the litigation process offer a solution to this problem. The
underlying assumption in the probabilistic patent theory seems to be that, if
a patent was exhaustively litigated (including appeals), the litigation would
conclusively establish a patent’s validity and enforceability. 44 Thus, the
theory seems to suggest, the only problem is that patents are not litigated as
frequently as they should be. This view is badly mistaken, however.
First, it is no answer to say that patents become probabilistic only once
they are litigated; if patent rights were probabilistic, then the mere chance
that someone could bring a challenge should be sufficient to shorten the
lawfully-enforceable patent term, even if only slightly. And while some
might expect that patent challenges would be brought only where patents are
weak, this is not true—particularly in the pharmaceutical area, where the
Hatch-Waxman Act permits a patent challenge without the would-be
infringer risking damages, and thus where it can be economically rational to
bring even longshot patent challenges. 45 Moreover, if patents were
probabilistic, any potential infringer would have an incentive to challenge
any patent regardless of its strength or weakness; merely doing so would,
after all, somewhat increase the likelihood of potential patent invalidation,
and on that basis alone would shorten the patent term.
Second, litigation is not a solution to this problem because even a
verdict in favor of the patentee would not result in a “100% patent,” except
with respect to the particular infringer at issue in that particular case. Even
if a patent is found to be valid and infringed by one challenger, collateral
estoppel often will fail to fully bar a subsequent challenge by another patent
challenger. 46 So while an upheld patent might become, say, a “98%
patent”—highly unlikely to ever be invalidated—there is never zero risk.
There could always be another patent challenger, there will thus always be
some risk with any patent, and every patent would therefore have something
less than the full statutory term granted by Congress.
44. See Shapiro & Lemley, supra note 1 at 75–76.
45. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 403 F.3d 1056, 1074-75 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
Hatch-Waxman Amendments grant generic manufacturers standing to mount a validity challenge without
incurring the cost of entry or risking enormous damages flowing from any possible infringement. HatchWaxman essentially redistributes the relative risk assessments.”) (internal citations omitted) (superseded
on other grounds by Actavis, 570 U.S. 136); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1020,
1031 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“patentees in Hatch-Waxman cases have no claim for damages, yet must typically
defend the validity of their patents”).
46. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971) (“Some
litigants—those who never appeared in a prior action—may not be collaterally estopped without litigating
the issue. They have never had a chance to present their evidence and arguments on the claim. Due
process prohibits estopping them despite one or more existing adjudications of the identical issue which
stand squarely against their position.”).
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Finally, while litigating a patent all the way through every patent
challenge may protect the patentee from later antitrust challenge, and thus
create a de facto “100% patent,” even this does not cure the core problem
because it still assumes that patent enforcement is inherently
anticompetitive. For example, a patentee with a “95% patent” that wants the
full term might choose to litigate to the very end against every challenge,
never settling and always taking the litigation all the way to the Supreme
Court. Because the patentee successfully petitioned a court in each case,
presumably the Noerr Pennington doctrine would protect the patentee from
antitrust liability for such enforcement. 47 This would thus be a way (likely
the only way) to obtain 100% of a patent term. But even so, Noerr
Pennington protection would merely shift the blame to the court rather than
the patentee; even such successful enforcement of a patent would still be
(incorrectly) viewed as the anticompetitive enforcement of a “95% patent”
for 100% of the term. Patent litigation is thus not a solution to the problems
posed by the probabilistic patent theory.
III. FTC V. ACTAVIS DOES NOT ADOPT A PROBABILISTIC VIEW OF PATENTS
The probabilistic patent theory is therefore contrary to law and would
fundamentally undermine the value of the patent system. Nonetheless, some
courts and commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court’s 2013
decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. 48 secretly adopted a probabilistic theory of
patents—and thus silently worked a sea change in the patent laws. 49 As
detailed below, however, this reading of Actavis is incorrect as Actavis
instead adopted only a theory based on the probabilistic nature of patent
litigation, not on probabilistic patents.
A. The Problem Actavis Sought to Solve: Schrödinger’s Patent
Actavis addressed the potential for antitrust challenges to so-called
“reverse payment” settlements, in which a patentee makes a “large”
“unexplained” payment to a would-be infringer in exchange for the infringer
dropping a challenge to the patent’s validity: 50

47. See Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
48. 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
49. See Cipro (Cal), 61 Cal. 4th at 143 (“Indeed, a critical insight undergirding Actavis is that
patents are in a sense probabilistic, rather than ironclad: they grant their holders a potential but not certain
right to exclude.”); but see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2153 (2016) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing the difference between (a) the “probabilistic” question of whether a patent
challenger is likely to succeed and (b) the ultimate question of the patent’s validity).
50. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 156.
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Company A sues Company B for patent infringement. The two companies
settle under terms that require (1) Company B, the claimed infringer, not
to produce the patented product until the patent’s term expires, and (2)
Company A, the patentee, to pay B many millions of dollars. Because the
settlement requires the patentee to pay the alleged infringer, rather than
the other way around, this kind of settlement agreement is often called a
“reverse payment” settlement agreement. And the basic question here is
whether such an agreement can sometimes unreasonably diminish
competition in violation of the antitrust laws. 51

Determining the competitive impact of a reverse payment generally
requires first establishing whether the patent at issue is valid and infringed. 52
If so, then any settlement that merely requires the challenger to stay off the
market during the patent term cannot be anticompetitive, because it would
do no more than reflect the patentee’s preexisting exclusionary rights.
Indeed, because many such agreements in fact allow the challenger onto the
market on a date prior to patent expiration, such an agreement may benefit
competition when compared to enforcing a valid and infringed patent. 53 On
the other hand, if the patent would have been held invalid or not infringed,
then agreeing to drop the patent challenge in return for payment could (the
Court held) harm competition in some cases. 54
Courts assessing the competitive impact of such a settlement thus face
what might be called “Schrödinger’s patent” 55—a patent that is either valid

51. Id. at 140–41.
52. See, e.g., Cipro (Cal), 61 Cal. 4th at 138 (explaining this challenge).
53. Indeed, several courts adopted the “scope of the patent” test on this basis, concluding that where
the litigation did not result in invalidation of a presumptively-valid patent then the competitive impact of
any settlement of that litigation must be measured against the competitive impact of the patent itself. See,
e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012) (adopting the “scope of the
patent” test); see also In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006) (same); In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (same); Valley Drug Co. v.
Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003) (same).
54. See Br. for Petitioner at 46, FTC. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013), (No. 12-416), 2013
WL 267027; In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
55. Erwin Schrödinger challenged the Copenhagen view of quantum mechanics that suggested that
a quantum system can remain in superposition, i.e., existing in multiple states, until observed. To test the
Copenhagen model, Schrödinger proposed an experiment in which a cat placed inside a sealed metal box
would be killed by poisonous gas if a radioactive atom with a 50% chance of decaying within an hour did
so. Because under the Copenhagen model such an unobserved atom would be in superposition and thus
would both simultaneously decay and not decay until observed, the cat would be both alive and dead until
someone opened the box, something Schrödinger considered impossible. See, e.g., Cabantac v. Holder,
736 F.3d 787, 792 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2013) (Murguia, J., dissenting) (“Schrödinger’s cat, originating in
quantum physics, is a symbol of something that exists in two contradictory states at the same time.”)
(citing TKO Equip. Co. v. C & G Coal Co., Inc., 863 F.2d 541, 545 (7th Cir. 1988) (“In a famous gedanken
experiment of quantum mechanics, Schrodinger’s cat remains suspended between life and death in a box,
neither alive nor dead until the box is opened and uncertainty about the decay of a radioactive particle is
resolved.”)).
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or invalid, but whose validity cannot immediately be determined. 56 Several
courts expressed concern that it might be impossible to determine whether
the patent was valid or invalid, or that, at bare minimum, having a subsequent
court re-try the patent case would defeat the point of settlement.57 Faced
with this problem, courts pre-Actavis presumed that the patent must be valid
because Congress instructed courts to make such a presumption. 58 This
became known as the “scope of the patent” test. Other courts, however,
effectively assumed that the patent was either invalid or irrelevant. 59
B. The Actavis Approach: Probabilistic Litigation, Not Probabilistic
Patents
Rather than adopt either approach, Actavis purports to solve this
problem a different way: by using the patentee’s conduct to infer something
about the likely expected outcome of the patent suit. Thus, the Court held
that an “unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally suggest
that the patentee has serious doubts about the patent’s survival,” and could
be a “workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court
to conduct a detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself.” 60 Later
commentators dubbed this the “Actavis inference.” 61
Importantly, although the California Supreme Court in Cipro (Cal)
understood Actavis to thus adopt a probabilistic view of patents, 62 the U.S.
Supreme Court never suggested that it was doing so. On the contrary, the
U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that even a large reverse payment might
56. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(“while Schrodinger’s cat may be both alive and dead at any given moment, even in theory, claim
limitations cannot be concurrently both met and not met”); Adrian v. Superchips, Inc., H-04-4117, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25212, at *24-25 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2006) (similar). Compare Actavis, 570 U.S. at
171 (Roberts, J, dissenting) (“First, a patent is either valid or invalid. The parties of course don’t know
the answer with certainty at the outset of litigation; hence the litigation. But the same is true of any hard
legal question that is yet to be adjudicated.”).
57. See, e.g., Watson, 677 F.3d at 1315 (discussing this problem, and the “turducken” task of trying
a patent case in an antitrust case).
58. See, e.g., Watson., 677 F.3d at 1315; Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d 187; Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d 1323;
Valley Drug, 344 F.3d 1294.
59. See, e.g., K-Dur, 686 F.3d 197.
60. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 157-58 (emphasis added); id. at 154-55 (reverse payment “signal[s] to other
potential challengers that the patentee lacks confidence in its patent”).
61. Id. at 158; Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp, & Carl Shapiro, The Actavis
Inference: Theory and Practice, 67 RUTGERS L. REV. 585 (2015). Whether this “workable surrogate”
actually works is a question for another day.
62. Cipro (Cal), 61 Cal. 4th at 144 n.9 (citing, e.g., Shapiro & Lemley, supra note 1; Shapiro, supra
note 1); Mark Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71 ANTITRUST
L. J. 1033 (2003) (arguing against probabilistic patents)); but see Joshua B. Fischman, The Circular Logic
of Actavis, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 91 (2016) (arguing that Actavis’s use of settlement terms to predict likely
strength or weakness of a patent requires treating predictions about litigation as effectively determinative
of litigation merits).

2021

PATENTS ARE NOT PROBABILITIES: REFUTING THE PROBABILISTIC PATENT THEORY

315

well signal nothing more than a small risk of invalidation, which the patentee
nonetheless seeks to eliminate—meaning that a reverse payment cannot
allow any inference of the actual validity/invalidity or infringement/noninfringement of the patent, but rather is useful only to show that there has
been some foreclosure of the patent litigation process, that there is some
undetermined potential patent vulnerability, and thus that there is some
potential for harm to competition from the settlement.63 Indeed, the U.S.
Supreme Court noted that “patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in
determining the scope of the patent monopoly.” 64 And none of the cases
Actavis cited contemplated a probabilistic approach. 65
The better reading of Actavis is thus that it addressed the probabilistic
outcome of the patent suit. 66 Unlike property, litigation has long been seen
as inherently probabilistic; though challenging to do so, courts are familiar
with the need to assess the probabilistic value of a case, for example, in
assessing malpractice or other claims about the litigation process. 67 And
63. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 157-58 (“The owner of a particularly valuable patent might contend, of
course, that even a small risk of invalidity justifies a large payment. But, be that as it may, the payment
(if otherwise unexplained) likely seeks to prevent the risk of competition. And, as we have said, that
consequence constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm.”); see also Barry Harris et al., Activating
Actavis: A More Complete Story, 28 ANTITRUST ABA 83 (2014) (explaining why such settlements might
be entered).
64. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 148.
65. Id. at 147-54 (citing United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948) (“[d]uring
its term, a valid patent excludes all except its owner from the use of the protected process or product”);
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 388-91 (1948) (addressing only cross-licensing);
Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965)
(allowing claim only where patent obtained by fraud); United States v. Singer Mfg., 374 U.S. 174, 19697 (1963) (“possession of a valid patent or patents does not give the patentee any exemption from the
provisions of the Sherman Act beyond the limits of the patent monopoly”); United States v. New Wrinkle,
342 U.S. 371, 378 (1952) (challenge only to cross-licensing of patents); Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
283 U.S. 163, 179 (1931); United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926) (patentee has
valid right to exercise patent); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 672-73 (1969) (court must determine
validity)).
66. Indeed, this is the understanding Justice Roberts appears to have had of the majority opinion,
as he explained in dissent that “The majority seems to think that even if the patent is valid, a patent holder
violates the antitrust laws merely because the settlement took away some chance that his patent would be
declared invalid by a court.” Actavis, 570 U.S. at 171 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Cf. In the Matter of Impax
Laboratories, Inc., 2019 FTC LEXIS 25, at *68 (F.T.C. Mar. 28, 2019) (holding that in “Actavis, the
Court recognized the inherently probabilistic nature of the underlying facts surrounding the settlement of
Hatch-Waxman Act litigation: patent validity; patent infringement; the outcome of patent litigation; the
willingness and ability of the generic drug manufacturer to launch at risk; and so on,” but not suggesting
that the patent was probabilistic).
67. See, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 586 U.S. 251, 262 (2013) (addressing role of patent in legal
malpractice case, where the patent case presented a “case-within-a-case”); LNV Corp. v. Branch Banking
& Trust Co., 723 Fed. Appx. 653, 658 (11th Cir. 2018) (noting that malpractice suits involve a
“probabilistic” analysis of how a case would have come out); Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1134
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (IRS may accept taxes based on probabilistic estimate of tax litigation); ); Fishman v.
Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 533 (7th Cir. 1986) (loss of a “fair shot” at winning a monopoly was
antitrust injury); N. Shore Gas Co. v. E.P.A., 930 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1991) (probabilistic chance
of winning lawsuit sufficient to support Article III standing); Sabine River Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,
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unlike a patent, a patent suit exists across a range of potential risk-adjusted
outcomes, including not only victory or defeat but also mixed results or
settlement. What Actavis holds, therefore, is not that patents are
probabilistic, but that when a patent settlement containing a large,
unexplained reverse payment forecloses the normal patent litigation process,
that foreclosure signals the possibility of a harm to competition—a harm that
can be assessed, at least on a motion to dismiss, “without forcing a court to
conduct a detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself.” 68
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF REJECTING PROBABILISTIC PATENT THEORY
Rejecting the probabilistic patent theory has several important
implications not only for patent law, but also for antitrust law.
A. A Patent May Be Enforced for the Congressionally Granted Term
The first, simplest, but in some ways most important implication of
rejecting the probabilistic theory of patents is simply that patentees may
continue to exercise the full term of their patent rights, rather than being
forced to shorten them in accordance with the unknowable probability that
the patent will be invalidated. Above we described the problem of a patentee
trying to determine the enforceable term of its patent under a probabilistic
patent theory—and the possibility that such term might depend on such
vagaries as which attorney happened to be at the podium. If that were the
law, patents would be an extraordinary exercise in guesswork. But, a patent
remains a patent, including after Actavis, and no grand sea change has
occurred.
B. Any Inference of Patent Weakness Is Rebuttable By Showing That
the Patent Was Valid
The conclusion that patents are not probabilistic also raises an important
caveat to Actavis, which is that the anticompetitive harm a court infers from
a large, unexplained reverse payment may well be illusory. 69 While there
951 F.2d 669, 674 (5th Cir. 1992); In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 755 & n.15 (E.D.
Pa. 2014) (“probabilistic harm . . . is neither foreign to antitrust jurisprudence nor to standing doctrine in
other areas of the law”) (emphasis added) (citing Bulletin Displays, LLC v. Regency Outdoor
Advertising, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1191-92, 1194 (C.D. Cal. 2007)); Wolfinger v. Cheche, 206
Ariz. 504, 80 P.3d 783 (Ct. Ap. Az. 2003) (involving a wrongful institution of civil proceedings case
about the institution of a wrongful institution of civil proceedings case, “a case within a case within a
case”).
68. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 158.
69. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 171 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“[S]ettling a patent claim cannot
possibly impose unlawful anticompetitive harm if the patent holder is acting within the scope of a valid
patent and therefore permitted to do precisely what the antitrust suit claims is unlawful. . . . I therefore

2021

PATENTS ARE NOT PROBABILITIES: REFUTING THE PROBABILISTIC PATENT THEORY

317

may be a shortcut to infer the possibility of patent weakness, if a court
determines that the patent was in fact valid and infringed then virtually any
settlement within the scope of that patent was procompetitive. The best
reading of Actavis is thus that it makes an inference of potential
anticompetitive harm based on the existence of a large, unexplained reverse
payment, not an irrebuttable determination, and that that the patent thus
continues to have a significant role to play in the rule of reason analysis under
Actavis and any other case that might involve initial inferences of potential
patent weakness. 70
C. Private Plaintiffs Must Show Patent Weakness to Establish
Antitrust Injury in Actavis Cases
Finally, because Actavis does not involve probabilistic patents, to show
antitrust injury a plaintiff bringing claims under Actavis must show patent
invalidity or non-infringement.
To assert an antitrust claim a private plaintiff must have antitrust
standing—it must have suffered an “injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes the defendants’
acts unlawful.” 71 Antitrust injury is a “distinct matter[] that must be shown
independently” from the underlying antitrust violation. 72 Because it “is
beyond fair dispute” that “a regulatory or legislative bar can break the chain
of causation in an antitrust case,” a private plaintiff must show that it was the
large, unexplained reverse payment that caused generic entry to be delayed,
and not instead the existence of a valid and infringed patent. 73
don’t see how the majority can conclude that it won’t normally be ‘necessary to litigate patent validity
to answer the antitrust question,’ unless it means to suggest that the defendant (patent holder) cannot raise
his patent as a defense in an antitrust suit. But depriving him of such a defense—if that’s what the majority
means to do—defeats the point of the patent, which is to confer a lawful monopoly on its holder.”).
70. This answers the concern expressed in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. (In re Androgel Antitrust Litig. (No.
II)), 09-cv-955-TWT, 2018 U.S. Dist. 99716, at *55 (N.D. Ga. June 14, 2018), regarding the different
outcomes potentially available for FTC and private actions. The court there noted that because the FTC
does not need to show antitrust injury and antitrust standing, the FTC might have reverse payment claims
even when a valid and infringed patent barred the same claims from private plaintiffs. The court noted
that it “makes no sense” for “Defendants [to] both have a valid patent, and commit an antitrust violation”
by enforcing that patent. Id. The answer, though, is that the FTC does not show an antitrust violation by
showing a large, unexplained reverse payment; rather, it simply creates a rebuttable inference of harm,
which can be refuted (among other ways) by the showing of a valid patent.
71. In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation, 868 F.3d 132, 164 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Ethypharm
S.A. France v. Abbott Labs., 707 F.3d 223, 233 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo BowlO-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)); see also Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petrol., 495 U.S. 328, 344
(1990) (“[P]roof of [an antitrust] violation and of antitrust injury are distinct matters that must be shown
independently. For this reason, . . . the right of action under § 4 of the Clayton Act is available only to
those private plaintiffs who have suffered antitrust injury”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
72. In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation, 842 F.3d 34, 60 (1st Cir. 2016).
73. Wellbutrin, 868 F.3d at 165 (citing RSA Media, Inc. v. AK Media Grp., Inc., 260 F.3d 10, 15
(1st Cir. 2001) (“That a regulatory or legislative bar can break the chain of causation in an antitrust case
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Actavis did not eliminate this requirement; Actavis’s comments on
patent validity were “only in the context of an antitrust violation, not
causation” 74 as the plaintiff there was the FTC, which is not required to show
antitrust injury. 75 Thus, while plaintiffs have argued that alleged reverse
payments should themselves be sufficient to show that the patents were
probabilistically invalid and thus not an independent bar to generic entry,76
effectively seeking to use the probabilistic patent theory to show antitrust
injury, at least two circuit courts have instead held that a plaintiff must
actually prove that the patents at issue were “more likely than not”
invalid/not infringed in order to show antitrust injury on that basis—i.e., that
the patent “would have” been invalidated. 77 These courts thus recognize that
plaintiffs cannot rely on a “probabilistic scope of the patent” test to show
antitrust injury under Actavis, but rather must show that their injury derives
from something other than a valid and infringed patent.
This conclusion also answers the courts that were concerned about
trying to “recreate” the patent case as part of the antitrust case. For example,
in Androgel, a court in the Northern District of Georgia understood the
inquiry as requiring a determination of “the ultimate outcome of the
underlying patent litigation.” 78 Close, but not quite, because a court need
not (as the court there suggested) “say how [the judge] would have ruled on
the summary judgment motions, how [the judge] would have construed the
claims, and whether [the judge] would have found infringement.” 79 Rather,

is beyond fair dispute.”); In re Canadian Import Antitrust Litig., 470 F.3d 785, 790-91 (8th Cir. 2006)
(federal law prevented import of Canadian drug products regardless of drug companies’ conduct with
respect to such products); City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn. Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 1998)
(“realities of the regulated environment” caused plaintiffs’ injury)).
74. Androgel, 2018 U.S. Dist. 99716, at *54.
75. See, e.g., Nexium, 842 F.3d at 60 (noting that “[p]rivate plaintiffs and the FTC as government
enforcer stand in different shoes” and thus that the FTC “is empowered to directly enforce the substantive
antitrust laws” while private plaintiffs must “satisfy the additional evidentiary burdens” of showing
antitrust injury); see also Apotex, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 3d 604, 613-14 & n.3 (E.D. Pa.
2017) (“[A]lthough the Actavis Court stated that ‘it is normally not necessary to litigate patent validity to
answer the antitrust question,’ that statement does not address a private plaintiff’s causation requirement
nor does it preclude examination of the validity of the patent where necessary.”).
76. Nexium, 842 F.3d at 63; Wellbutrin, 868 F.3d at 167-68.
77. See Nexium, 842 F.3d at 63 (quoting In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 133 F. Supp. 3d 734,
765 n.46 (E.D. Pa. 2015)); Wellbutrin, 868 F.3d at 167-68 (noting that Actavis had concluded that “the
size of a reverse payment may have some relevance in determining how confident a litigant is in the
strength of its case,” but that this “is far from dispositive” when the case is “complex and multi-faceted”);
see also Apotex, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 613-14 (evidence of patent invalidity may be relevant to showing
causation); Androgel, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99716, at *50-54.
78. Androgel, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99716, at *45.
79. See id.
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the question is not “what would have happened,” but rather simply “is there
a valid and infringed patent”—a question courts know how to answer. 80
Admittedly, this is not the only approach taken by courts; some courts
have held that antitrust injury could be based on patent invalidity or noninfringement under a “could have won” standard, i.e., that if the generic
could potentially have won the patent case and invalidated the patent / been
held not to infringe, then the patent should be viewed as de facto invalid or
not infringed for antitrust purposes. 81 However, this approach is incorrect
for at least three reasons.
First, the “could have won” standard originated with a district court’s
misreading of a circuit court decision. In Nexium the First Circuit noted that
the “plaintiffs did not present . . . evidence” of patent invalidity or noninfringement, and thus could not use such invalidity or non-infringement to
survive summary judgment because obviously a plaintiff must present at
least “some evidence” of what it seeks to prove.82 Most could agree that
whatever the evidentiary standard, it is greater than “no evidence at all.”
However, in Lidoderm a district court then took this proposition and overanalyzed it, holding that “‘[s]ome evidence’ is not the same as requiring
plaintiffs to prove that the generic defendant would have won, only that it
could have.” 83 But Nexium never described the level of evidence required—
it merely noted that the level of evidence required to overcome a
presumptively valid patent by showing that it is invalid or not infringed is
obviously something greater than “none.” 84
Second, because litigation is never risk-free, under a broad enough
interpretation the generic almost always “could have won”—and thus the
“could have won” standard is effectively no standard at all. As one court
noted, “[o]bviously it is much easier to provide substantive proof of what
could have happened as opposed to what would have happened,” but that
“evidence that the Generics could have won gets us no closer than we are
now to answering the question of whether the Generics would have been able

80. Perhaps for this reason, the Third Circuit in Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC v. Par Sterile Products,
LLC, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 614, at *12 (3d Cir. 2021), in a non-precedential opinion, held that Androgel
was “irreconcilable with Wellbutrin” and thus should not be considered in the Third Circuit.
81. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 & Participating Employers Health & Welfare
Fund v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc. (In re Lidoderm Antitrust Litigation), 296 F. Supp. 3d 1142, 1155
(N.D. Cal. 2017); see also In re Solodyn (Minocycline Hydrochloride) Antitrust Litig., 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11921, at *54-55 (D. Mass. Jan. 25, 2018) (following Lidoderm).
82. Nexium, 842 F.3d at 63.
83. Lidoderm, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 1155; see also Solodyn, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11921, at *54-55
(relying on Lidoderm’s error).
84. Nexium, 842 F.3d at 63.
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to enter the market in a but-for world, or if a valid patent would have
prevented them.” 85
Third, and most fundamentally, this analysis simply misunderstands the
question posed here. That question is not whether there is some world in
which the litigation could have come out differently. Of course there is,
because the key witness could have been hit by a bus, among other potential
unpredictable outcomes. Rather, the question a court must ask in
determining antitrust injury is whether a valid and infringed patent precludes
showing such antitrust injury. For these purposes, what could have happened
in the patent case is a red herring; indeed, even determining what “would”
have happened is useful only in the sense that it requires deciding if the
patent is valid and infringed, which is the actual question required.
Finally, plaintiffs that cannot show patent invalidity or noninfringement have sometimes sought to prove antitrust injury by instead
showing that absent a reverse payment, the parties to the settlement would
have entered into an alternative settlement with an earlier entry date.86
However, the alternative settlement approach misses the point of the injury
question, which is not whether the parties could have reached a different
settlement, but rather whether there was a valid and enforceable patent that
independently bars entry. To illustrate the problem, consider two
hypothetical patentees facing meritless patent challenges against identically
ironclad patents:
Patentee A is not risk-averse and is before a judge who has a long record
of upholding patents and finding them to be infringed. While Patentee A
would be willing to make a reverse payment to avoid the small risk it
perceives from litigation, it will not take any “alternative settlement” that
cuts even a day off of its ironclad patent’s term. If it cannot make a reverse
payment to settle, it will litigate to the very end and almost certainly win.
Patentee B also has an ironclad patent, but is risk-averse, and before a
judge with a long track record of finding ways to invalidate patents. Patentee
B is willing to make a reverse payment to avoid the greater risk it perceives
from litigation, or alternatively if it could not make a reverse payment, it
would allow an earlier entry date to settle.
A plaintiff might be able to show that Patentee B would have accepted
an alternative entry date but could not do so with respect to Patentee A
simply because Patentee A had a better judicial draw and a higher level of
risk tolerance. But because the two patents are identically strong, and indeed
85.
86.

Androgel, 2018 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 99716, at *52-5352-53 & n.108.
See Wellbutrin, 868 F.3d at 166.

2021

PATENTS ARE NOT PROBABILITIES: REFUTING THE PROBABILISTIC PATENT THEORY

321

would be found valid and infringed if push came to shove, the differences
between these two parties, or the happenstance of their judicial draws, should
not be relevant. The patent is what matters, and where that patent is valid
and infringed it serves as an independent regulatory bar to antitrust injury. 87
The willingness to enter an alternative settlement thus tells us nothing about
the actual issue of antitrust injury in the face of a valid and infringed patent. 88
V. CONCLUSION
Shapiro and Lemley’s probabilistic theory of patents is at odds with
recent Supreme Court authority, is at odds with traditional understandings of
property rights, would work a negative sea change in the patent laws, and
was not silently adopted the U.S. Supreme Court as the California Supreme
Court incorrectly concluded. Probabilistic patent theory must therefore be
rejected.

87. See Nexium, 842 F.3d at 63; Wellbutrin, 868 F.3d at 167-68
88. Nor is it any answer to say that an alternative settlement would have benefited consumers. Any
such theory runs squarely into the Supreme Court’s longstanding warning against declaring an agreement
“anticompetitive” solely in reference to some other, supposedly more procompetitive arrangement. See
Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408-10, 415-16
(2004).

